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Preparations for a Storm: A Proposal for
Managing the Litigation Stemming from
September 1 1 th, 2001
A. David E. Balahadia'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the two years since September 11th, 2001, the United States government
has overthrown the Taliban, liberated Iraq, and captured Saddam Hussein. De-
spite these victories abroad, the United States government has unresolved issues
on the home front. The attacks of September 11 th , 2001 resulted in the deaths of
2,749 people while thousands more were injured both directly and indirectly as a
result of the attacks.2 It has been estimated that the attacks caused economic
losses of more than $70 billion.'
After the attacks, the United States government immediately began to ad-
dress the exorbitant number of problems and issues that resulted. One of the
first issues the government addressed was victim compensation. The creation of
the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund by virtue of the Air Transporta-
tion Safety and System Stabilization Act was the first step towards victim com-
pensation.4 The VCF would help relatives and families of those killed in the
attacks. However, the VCF has several limitations that narrow the scope of
those eligible for compensation.5
The limitations of the VCF are indirectly creating a new two-pronged prob-
lem: the first prong is that many have found the VCF to be an inadequate
method of exacting a measure of justice; some relatives and individuals repre-
1. J.D. Candidate, 20 04, Pepperdine University School of Law. My thanks to Mom and Dad,
for all that they have done.
2. Eric Lipton, New York Settles on a Number That Defines Tragedy: 2,749 Dead in Trade
Center Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at B7. In the days after the attacks, New York City esti-
mated an initial death toll of 6,700; that number has been reduced after a thorough investigative
process. Id. This number is not reflective of the impact of that day: Nikki Stem, whose husband
was killed in the attacks, states: "Whether it was 3,000, 2,900, or 2,700, I don't believe it makes a
difference to individual families that suffered a loss or to those who witnessed or were touched by
the event... [wihat matters is that magnitude of the loss and the way it affected us all." Id.
3. John W. Stamper, Looking At The Events Of September 11: Some Effects And Implica-
tions, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 152, 158 (2002).
4. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (hereinafter referred to as
"ATSSSA"), Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230, 230 (2001)(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.). See
also infra notes 14 - 15 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 26 - 43 and accompanying text.
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senting those killed on September 1 Ith have filed lawsuits against foreign parties
and organizations believed to be partially or directly responsible.6 These liti-
gants will likely find the same frustrating conclusion that previous litigants have
found when dealing with this type of litigation scenario.7 The second prong,
embedded in the limitations of the VCF, has precluded many from participating
in the compensation fund; as a result, they have begun to seek other means of
compensation by filing lawsuits against United States companies and govern-
mental agencies. 8 This second prong has the potential to create a relative legal
crisis that could be comparable to the asbestos litigation of the 1980s and
i990s. 9
I propose an alternative means to the litigation which stems from the events
of September 1 I1h in this article: the United States should establish a compensa-
tory fund and tribunal. This will serve as a means of dealing with the litigation
stemming from the events of September 1 Ith, 2001. This model balances the
resources and constraints of the United States government and legal system
against the needs of the victims of September 1 Ith. The model proposed here
goes beyond the VCF: it is more inclusive in its scope and coverage and is mod-
eled after international reparations tribunals.
I will start by reviewing the VCF and discuss its history, policies, and limi-
tations.' ° I will then explore the two-pronged problem mentioned above by first
looking at lawsuits being filed against foreign parties and then examine lawsuits
being filed in the domestic arena." Next, I will review various international
reparations tribunals that have been used in recent decades. 2 Based on these
factors, I propose that some form of a compensatory fund and tribunal be estab-
lished to address these problems. In the final section of this article, I will dis-
cuss some particular matters and issues relevant to the idea of establishing a
compensatory fund of this type.'3 The morning of September 11th, 2001 created
myriad problems, issues, and challenges which will occupy our country for
years. Accordingly, the solution to these problems lies in extraordinary meas-
ures.
6. See infra notes 55 - 67 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 70 - 90 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 95 - 103 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 14 - 54 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 55 -130 and accompanying text. This paper will focus on litigation that is
being brought by relatives and families of victims who were killed on September I I"h in the World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Harrisville, Pennsylvania, as well as other potential litigation (such
as actions regarding property loss, general personal injury, lawsuits due to dust cloud fallout, etc.)
proximately stemming out of September 1 1h. For the purposes of this paper, this discussion will be
limited to only U.S. citizens or nationals as claimants, and thus not include lawsuits or actions
brought by families or relatives of foreign nationals residing or visiting in the United States.
12. See infra notes 131 - 158 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 159 - 177 and accompanying text.
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II. CURRENT MEANS TO COMPENSATE THOSE KILLED OR DIRECTLY INJURED
ON SEPTEMBER I 1 TH
A. An Overview of the September 11 h Victim Compensation Fund of 2001
Less than two weeks after the attacks took place, President George W. Bush
signed into law the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act
(hereinafter referred to as "ATSSSA") as a means of compensating those indi-
viduals and companies who sustained losses as a result of the terrorist attacks on
September 22, 2001.4 Title IV of the ATSSSA called for the establishment of
the September 1 th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (hereinafter referred to
as "VCF"). "
The purpose of the VCF was to "provide compensation to any individual (or
relatives of a deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a
result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September I Ith, 2001. ' ' 1 It was
designed to present a no-fault alternative to civil litigation, which by its nature is
risky, expensive, and protracted by offering a means of compensation which is
predictable, inexpensive, and swift. 7 The fund has been described as the single
largest no-fault statute ever enacted. 8 Progress in the set up and administration
of the Fund was swift, with the Final Rule regarding implementation of the pro-
gram taking effect on March 13th, 2002.'9 The VCF provides for compensation
via monies, with an expected minimum of at least $250,000 for beneficiaries,
such as widows and children.2' The payments to beneficiaries are tax free.2'
14. See ATSSSA, supra note 4. See also Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the
Context ofSeptember 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831, 1867 (2002). Rabin postulates that the ATSSSA and
VCF were created out of a mix of sympathy for the victims as well as the great concern that the
airline industry would collapse. Id.
15. See ATSSSA, supra note 4.
16. Id.
17. See September 11 i'Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 Action: Final Rule, Statement by
the Special Master (hereinafter "Statement by the Special Master"), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/finalrule.html.
18. See Richard P. Campbell, Implementing the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund: Two Steps
Forward, One Step Back, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 409, 409 (2002).
19. See Statement by the Special Master, supra note 17. The final rule was the third and final
step in establishing the VCF, following the November 5, 2001 Notice of Inquiry and Advance No-
tice of Rulemaking ("Notice of Inquiry") and the December 21, 2001 interim final rule. Id.
20. 28 C.F.R. § 104.3 (2004). See also Statement by the Special Master, supra note 17. The
VCF is administered in the following way: all claims are to be determined within 120 days, and
payments are made 20 days after that determination. Id. All determinations are made by a Special
Master, Kenneth Feinberg, who was appointed by Attorney General John Ashcroft. Id. The deter-
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The last date to submit a claim to the VCF was December 22nd, 2003;22 as of
January 24th, 2004, the total number of claims submitted to the VCF was
7,298.23 The VCF has issued awards to 1,892 claimants with the average award
being $1,827,435 after offsets.24 Unfortunately, it is likely that the total number
of submitted claims to the fund (7,298) does not reflect the actual number of
potential claims which stem from September 11 h, as will be explained infra.25
B. Limitations of the Victim Compensation Fund
There are several key limitations imposed by the VCF. The first key limita-
tion is that the VCF has a narrow scope in its eligibility. The VCF is limited in
space and time to individuals present at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, or
Shanksville, Pennsylvania site at the time of or in the immediate aftermath of the
crashes and who suffered physical harm as a direct result of the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes.26 The VCF defined the term "immediate aftermath" as a time
period of: from the time of the crashes to twelve hours after the event, with an
exception to rescue workers, for whom the time period extends to ninety-six
hours after the event.27 The term "physical harm" is defined as having a physi-
cal injury to the body within twenty-four hours of the injury, or within seventy-
two hours for those who did not immediately realize the extent of their injuries
or for whom medical treatment was not readily available. 28 This requirement of
"physical harm" has stringent additional requirements: either hospitalization for
twenty-four hours, or partial/total physical disability, incapacity, or disfigure-
ment.29
These eligibility requirements have severely limited who may qualify for
compensation under the VCF. Groups potentially excluded include cleanup
crews who were at the site weeks and/or months after the event 30 as well as the
minations are final and not subject to judicial review by any court. Id. However, the process allows
a right to hearing but is designed to fast track claims. Id. See also Rabin, supra note 14, at 1837.
21. See Statement by the Special Master, supra note 17.
22. 28 C.F.R. § 104.62 (2004).
23. General Award Statistics, at the September 1 I h Victim Compensation Fund of 2001
Website, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/paymentsdeceased.html.
24. Id.
25. See infra notes 108 - 129 and accompanying text.
26. 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(a)(1) (2004) (emphasis added).
27. 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(b) (2004).
28. 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(c)(1) (2004).
29. 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(c)(1)(i-ii) (2004).
30. See Rabin, supra note 14, at 1848-49. See also Campbell, supra note 18, at 420-21, 429-
30 (Campbell anticipates that there will be mass tort litigation stemming from the aftermath and
effects of September I I1h, partially because of toxic substance fallout from the collapse of the Twin
Towers); Kenneth G. Kubes, "United We Stand": Managing Choice-of-Law Problems in Septem-
ber-l1-Based Toxic Torts Through Federal Substantive Mass-Tort Law, 77 IND. L.J. 825, 855-56
(2002).
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thousands exposed to the dust cloud arising as a result of the fall of the World
Trade Center. 31 The basic language of the regulations would also exclude those
who suffered only minor bodily harm, emotional harm, or property damage as a
result of the events.32 Thus, while it does help some people, the VCF simply
does not help enough people-there are many more who were injured by the
attacks as well as previous terrorist acts than the VCF allows for in its compen-
sation scheme.33
The VCF also limits compensation by collateral sources. Collateral
sources, which includes "life insurance, pension funds, death benefits programs,
and payments by Federal, State, or local governments related to the terrorist-
related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001" are deducted from the final
award given to those who qualify before the issuance of VCF compensation.34
The original collateral source deduction scheme included charitable gifts, dona-
tions, and tax benefits as a deductible collateral source; however, public outcry
swayed the drafters of the regulations, and now these gifts, donations, and tax
benefits do not constitute collateral source deductions.35
The final major limitation is the restriction of the ability to file a civil ac-
tion. Upon submission of a claim to the VCF, a claimant automatically waives
the right to file or be a party to an action in any federal or state court for dam-
ages sustained in September I lth.36 This waiver seemingly applies regardless of
whether a claim is approved or denied. 37 Furthermore, should a person who is
engaged in a civil action for damages stemming out of September 11h wish to
submit a claim to the VCF, that person must withdraw from the lawsuit in order
to be eligible to submit a claim. 38 Thus, in accepting compensation from the
VCF, the tradeoff is that a party's ability to file a civil action is severely lim-
31. See Rabin, supra note 14, at 1843-44.
32. A person who lost employment because of September 1 i'h or suffered psychological
trauma would be excluded from this program-the VCF is limited to severe physical injury and
wrongful death claims only. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 410.
33. Cf Richard P. Campbell, The View from the Chair: Tort-Model Compensation, 31
WINTER BRIEF 4, 6 (2002) (debating the compensation for victims of bioterror, families of soldiers
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole). Many commentators have anticipated
the likelihood of mass tort litigation after September 11
h in the context of personal injury, property
damage, and other related issues. See, e.g., Kubes, supra note 30, at 851-52 (detailing some who
have given intent to sue as well as those who have sued over issues resulting from September I Ih).
34. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(a) (2004).
35. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(b) (2004). See also Kenneth P. Nolan & Jeanne M. O'Grady, A Year
Later-The September I1Ph Victim Compensation Fund, 17 AIR & SPACE LAw. 6, 6-7 (2002).
36. 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(a) (2004).
37. Id.
38. 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(b) (2004).
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ited.39 However, under 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(b), the legislation does allow for
lawsuits against "any person who is a knowing participant in any conspiracy to
hijack any aircraft or commit any terrorist act" and also allows for actions for
the recovery of collateral source obligations.
40
The United States government explicitly enacted the ATSSSA to function,
in part, as a means to curtail litigation of claims for damages sustained as a re-
sult of September I Ith.4 1 This limitation is clearly intended to discourage civil
lawsuits against airlines, airports, and those domestic companies and agencies
who theoretically may be partly to blame. In the actual language of the
ATSSSA, there is a provision limiting liability and actions for damages in any
civil lawsuit stemming from September 1 Ith to the maximum amount of liability
coverage that an airline possesses.42 The VCF works to limit lawsuits on the
domestic front; however, the VCF does not limit 43 lawsuits on the international
front.
C. The Pros and Cons of the Victim Compensation Fund
Critics have both praised and criticized the VCF from nearly every angle.
44
Praise for the VCF has been everything from discussions on its fairness, "about
as fair as it could possibly be",45 to its ability to heal, "a good start on the road to
recovery. '46  Some theorize that the VCF presents a new way of dealing with
mass tort litigation.47 Others have said that the ATSSSA served to preserve the
economy, save the airlines, and also ensure compensation.48
However, there are critics who target the negative aspects of the VCF as
well, particularly in the area of limitation of recovery by collateral sources. In
response to criticism that the collateral sources limitation takes away from what
is given, collateral sources were limited to exclude certain government bene-
39. See Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 35, at 6. See also Noah H. Kushlefsky, The Choice
Between the Victim Compensation Fund and Litigation, Los ANGELES LAWYER, September 2002, at
13.
40. 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(b) (2004).
41. See ATSSSA, supra note 4.
42. Id. Given the theoretical amounts recoverable absent such a limitation, it is a sound provi-
sion. However, even absent lawsuits from those affected by September 11h, a number of U.S. air-
lines have had significant financial difficulties after September 116, and some have filed for bank-
ruptcy.
43. 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(b) (2004).
44. See Rabin, supra note 14, at 1868 n. 140. See also Stamper, supra note 3, at 162.
45. See Statement by the Special Master, supra note 17 (quoting NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2001).
See also Rabin, supra note 14, at 1836. Rabin recognizes that in implementing the VCF, Congress
did the best job possible under the unique and singular circumstances presented by the attacks. Id.
46. See Statement by the Special Master, supra note 17 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001).
47. See Martha Neil, Taking Mass Torts out of Court, 10 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 11 (2002).
48. See Stephen P. Watters & Joseph S. Lawder, The Impact of September 11 h on Tort Law
and Insurance, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 809, 810 (2003).
6
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol4/iss1/3
[Vol. 4: 61, 2003]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
fitS. 49 Many critics are just plain skeptical about the nature of the program.5 °
Criticism has also arisen as to the amounts distributed by the VCF: namely, the
formula that the VCF uses to calculate compensation shortchanged victims'
families whose deceased relative's earning power was relatively large.5 Some
do not see the VCF as an altruistic government gift; they see it for its ulterior
motive in preventing lawsuits against corporations. 5 Others criticized the pro-
gram because of the limitation of lawsuits for damages.53 Finally, some have
complained about the nature of the program itself, arguing that the VCF should
not only be about financial compensation, but also about emotional healing.54
III. LITIGATION ARISING FROM SEPTEMBER I 1TH: THE POTENTIAL FOR A
NEW WAVE OF MASS TORT LITIGATION
A. The International Side of Lawsuits Stemming from September 1 ]h: Terrorists,
Foreign Organizations and Companies, and Countries
28 C.F.R. § 104.61(b), as enacted by the ATSSSA, allows for the filing of
lawsuits against "any person who is a knowing participant in any conspiracy to
hijack any aircraft or commit any terrorist act" regardless of whether the person
is pursuing a claim with the VCF.5 5 As such, some parties have filed civil law-
suits against those believed to be responsible or partly responsible for September
I 1 th. These suits were filed not only to help compensate those who sustained
deep losses, but also to inflict damage on terrorists by financially bankrupting
49. "Certain government benefits, such as tax relief, contingent Social Security benefits, and
contingent workers' compensation benefits (or comparable contingent benefits for government
employees), need not be treated as collateral source compensation. Also, because we do not believe
that Congress intended to treat a victim's savings accounts or similar investments as collateral source
compensation, the collateral-source offsets will not include moneys or other investments in victims'
401(k) accounts." Statement by the Special Master, supra note 17.
50. See Kushlefsky, supra note 39, at 14.
51. Martin Kasindorf, Some 9/11 Families Choose Lawsuits Over Federal Fund: Relatives
Say Goal Isn't Just Money But To 'Get Answers', U.S.A. TODAY, July 14, 2003, at IA. At a certain
point, families sued Feinberg on those grounds; a New York federal judge later upheld Feinberg's
mles. Id.
52. Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 35, at 6. Many families see the government as favoring
business over victims and are dissatisfied with the compensation they would see from the VCF
against that given to airlines. Id.
53. See Statement by the Special Master, supra note 17.
561 54. Nolan & O'Grady, supra note 35, at 7. See also Roger P. Alford, On War As Hell, 3 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 207, 214 (2002).
55. 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(b) (2004).
7
Balahadia: Preparations for a Storm: A Proposal for Managing the Litigation
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2003
their funding. 56 The American military has been fighting back with bombs and
bullets, while American attorneys have begun fighting back with summonses
and legal briefs, adding another layer to the complexity of September I Ih.
Several United States law firms across different states have begun the proc-
ess of civil litigation.57 Complaints have been filed and litigation has begun.
There are two major cases which have received national exposure.58 The first of
these, Burnett v. al Barada Investment and Dev. Corp., is seeking damages
against numerous companies, banks, charities, organizations, and individuals
who are believed to be fully or partly responsible for assisting in the funding or
support of terrorism. 59 The plaintiffs in this case, as of the Third Amended
Complaint filed on November 22, 2002, number approximately 2,600.60  The
Burnett lawsuit alleges claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(hereinafter referred to as "FSIA"), 61 the Torture Victim Protection Act,62 and
56. See September 1I Class Action website, at http://www.septemberl lclassaction.coml. See
also 7 Families Sue bin Laden and Others for Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at AlI.
57. The cases discussed here deal with recovery in tort. A minor insurance case of note is
being litigated by Larry Silverstein, the leaseholder of the World Trade Center. See Insurance Battle
Over Twin Towers, BBC NEWS WORLD EDrrION, July 23, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/lI/hi/business/3089447.stm. Silverstein is alleging that the attacks on the
World Trade Center constituted two separate attacks, which would mean double the insurance
money received from insurers. Id.
58. The plaintiffs' cases discussed herein are being litigated by plaintiffs who are relatives,
spouses, and children of people killed or seriously wounded in the attacks. Another case has been
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by five major insur-
ance companies, including Chubb Corporation, Zurich American Insurance Company, One Beacon
Insurance Group, American Reinsurance Company, and Crum & Forster. See Jeff Blumenthal,
Insurers Sue Over 9/11 Attacks, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. I1, 2003, at I. This complaint is
aimed at bin-Laden, al-Qaida, dozens of terrorist organizations, and five countries (Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, and Syria). Id. The insurance companies are seeking over $300 billion for claims
paid out to victims of the attacks. Id. The insurance companies are hoping to consolidate their case
with the cases of Burnett and Havlish described herein. Id.
59. Third Amended Complaint, Burnett v. al Barada Investment and Dev. Corp., filed No-
vember 22, 2002, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorismfburnettbal 12202acmp.pdf.
60. Id.
61. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2004). The FSIA, as origi-
nally enacted, was not meant as a means of pursuing claims of victims of terrorism. However, the
FSIA was amended in two key ways to satisfactorily permit using it as a tool against terrorism. See
S. Jason Baletsa, The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the Theory and Practice of the 1996
Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (2000). The
first amendment was made by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (28
U.S.C.A. § 1605 (2004)), which provides that nations designated as supporting terrorism are not
immune from United States civil lawsuits that they had a part in and also allows the attachment of
property or assets to satisfy a judgment related to the civil lawsuit. Id. at 1261. Claims for personal
injury or death, such as the ones being sought by Burnett, et al. are permissible under the FSIA. Id.
at 1262. The second amendment to the FSIA was made by the. Civil Liability for Acts of State-
Sponsored Terrorism Act in 1997 (Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996)), more com-
monly known as the Flatow amendment, after whom it was created. Id. at 1263. Alisa Flatow was
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the Alien Tort Claims Act 63 for damages by reason of wrongful death, negli-
gence, survival, conspiracy, and various RICO violations. 64 The second case is
Havlish v. Sheikh Usamah bin-Muhammad bin-Laden, in which damages are
sought against not only bin-Laden himself, but also hundreds of companies,
organizations, individuals, and even the countries of Iran and Iraq as they are
believed to be responsible or partly responsible for the events of September
11 th.65 The seven plaintiffs in the case applied for class certification on May 9,
2002.66 This suit is seeks damages under the same rationale as the Burnett law-
suit.
6 7
What seems like a straightforward attempt to help bring justice to those re-
sponsible is actually a much more complicated problem. As will be discussed,
infra, victims of past terrorist attacks against United States citizens have brought
lawsuits against the individuals who were responsible and have won default
judgments in their favor.68 In trying to collect and enforce the judgments, the
plaintiffs turned to the United States to ask that frozen assets be liquidated to
help satisfy the judgments. Herein lies the difficulty: it is the general policy of
the United States to hold frozen assets so that they can be used as bargaining
chips and incentives in diplomatic negotiations and relations. This policy has
served to frustrate the efforts of past plaintiffs. The same will likely happen
an American undergraduate student killed by a terrorist act in Israel. Id. Her father subsequently
brought suit, and the Flatow amendment was created to broaden the FSIA to impose civil liability for
recovery for non-economic harms. Id. at 1261. Effectively, these two amendments gave the FSIA
real teeth and reach. For further discussions of the FSIA, see also generally Sean D. Murphy, U.S.
Judgments Against Terrorist States, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 134 (2001); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L LAW & DisP. RESOL. 57 (2001);
62. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
64. See Burnett Complaint, supra note 59.
65. Amended Complaint, Havlish v. Sheikh Usamah bin-Muhammad bin-Laden, filed May 3,
2002, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, available at
http://www.septemberl lclassaction.com/AmendedComplaint-Final.pdf. It should be noted that the
FSIA only permits suing foreign countries if those countries are designated as terrorist states (these
countries include Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria). See Lori Fisler Dam-
rosch, Sanctions Against Perpetrators of Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 63, 65 (1999).
66. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, Havlish v. Sheikh Usamah bin-Muhammad bin-
Laden, filed May 9, 2002, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, available
at http://www.septemberl lclassaction.com/ClassCertificationCompleteDocument.pdf.
67. See Amended Havlish Complaint, supra note 65.
68. See infra notes 74 - 94 and accompanying text.
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again with this litigation.69 Despite potentially winning, the plaintiffs' efforts
may ultimately be for naught.
1. Inherent Problems in Attempting Recovery
All plaintiffs face an inherent danger in litigation: they face a process which
by its nature tends to be long, risky, and complicated. There are several issues
present in pursuing this particular type of lawsuit. The first is the issue of time.
The average case takes several years to reach trial. With a case where defen-
dants number in the thousands, how long will it take for the case to reach any
sort of real resolution? Such litigation has the possibility of dragging on for
years.7" And then there is the issue of risk: each of the lawsuits are seeking de-
fendants so elusive that the State Department itself is having trouble finding
them. How does one litigate an action with defendants whose respective loca-
tions remain unknown? In previous actions, plaintiffs typically obtained default
judgments: the key reason is the defendants never actually appeared.7 It is
likely that situation will manifest here as well. Even if plaintiffs win a proper
judgment, there remains the issue of collection: how are the plaintiffs going to
be able to collect and enforce a judgment?72 While plaintiffs may obtain a
judgment through default, enforcing a judgment against defendants as ephemeral
as these will prove to be more than problematic.73
2. Lawsuits of Victims of Previous Terrorist Acts
Victims of other terrorist attacks prior to September 1 I th have filed (and
quite often, won usually by default judgment) lawsuits seeking damages.74
While these plaintiffs have obtained favorable judgments in terrorism-related
actions, approximately 190 judgments are currently outstanding.7 5  The vast
majority of these judgments have been against Iraq for injuries in the Gulf War,
69. In an unfortunate legal irony, it was reported recently that assets which were sought in
September I1 Ih related litigation have been liquidated to pay for the legal fees and attorneys' fees in
the cases. See Gregory L. Vistica, Frozen Assets Going to Legal Bills, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2003,
at A06.
70. See Kushlefsky, supra note 39, at 16.
71. See Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1289.
72. See Kushlefsky, supra note 39, at 16. See also Stamper, supra note 3, at 161. Stamper
suggests that the best course would be to file a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 2339(A), and
2339(B) which would allow a later possible claim against the frozen assets of defendants. Id. How-
ever, he does concede that procedural issues would be difficult to overcome. Id.
73. See Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1289.
74. Id. at 1289-90.
75. Melissa B. Robinson, Terror Victims Seek Frozen Assets, LEDGER-ENQUIRER.COM, Oct.
31, 2002, at http://www.ledger-enquirer.commldlledgerenquirer/news/politics/4409443.htm.
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while some are against Iran for various terrorist acts.16 As a matter of practical
purpose, an extraordinary difficulty lies in enforcing and collecting on these
judgments, because of two factors: foreign state attitudes and United States for-
eign policy.
a. Foreign State Attitudes towards United States Judgments
The first factor is that many foreign states are simply unwilling to recognize
or respect the judgments of American courts.77 It is likely that this is a problem
which those litigating September 1 1 th claims will face. Some anticipate that the
collection of these judgments will "inevitably result in prolonged, complex legal
actions that will deny families closure for years to come. 78 Repeated attempts
to collect on judgments have turned positive judgments into "Pyrrhic victo-
ries." 9 While these previous lawsuits are a legal success, they are also a practi-
cal failure.
b. United States Foreign Policy and Frozen Assets
The second factor prohibiting many plaintiffs from collecting on judgments
is the foreign policy objectives of the United States. In light of the difficulty
that foreign states have presented when plaintiffs attempt to collect a judgment,
many plaintiffs have asked the United States to have previously frozen foreign
assets liquidated in order to help satisfy a judgment.8 ' These frozen assets are in
the form of actual cash holdings as well as foreign and diplomatic properties.
8
However, the foreign policy of the United States presents several difficulties.
Previous lawsuits involving terrorist actions frequently raised this question:
how are the federal courts going to interact (or potentially interfere) with United
76. Id. See also Joel Mowbray, Who's The Enemy?, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW, Nov. 17,
2002, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/opinion/guest/s 102767.html.
77. See Mowbray, supra note 76. See also Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1292-93.
78. Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1295.
79. Id. at 1298.
80. Jeffrey Donovan, Iran: Hostage Case Highlights U.S. Diplomatic Dilemma, RFE/RL,
Dec. 14, 2001, available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/12/14122001095030.asp. The
Havlish lawsuit is also seeking to take title to assets frozen by the United States (but title is not
claimed by the United States) and give them to the families of those killed on September 11h. See
September II Class Action website, available at http://www.septemberl I classaction.com/.
81. See Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1292-93, 1298-99 (stating that diplomatic property sought in
enforcing judgments, in particular, is quite difficult to obtain).
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States foreign policy? 82 The State Department believes that the United States
government should retain possession and control of the frozen assets.8 3 Assets
are typically frozen as economic sanctions against a foreign power, or utilized
"against targeted countries, terrorists, international drug traffickers, and those
engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion., 84  The U.S. Government believes that freezing assets proves useful for
diplomatic relations and should not be liquidated to help satisfy outstanding
claims and judgments.8 ' The government has repeatedly stopped or blocked
efforts by litigants to attach or possess assets held by foreign governments, or
connected to foreign companies and corporations.86 The rationale behind this
decision is that foreign countries will be more likely to help in the fighting and
stopping of terrorism, as well as being more cooperative overall on other matters
if they are able to regain their frozen assets 87 - thus, the frozen assets act as
bargaining chips in the game of diplomacy. 8 For example, in 1979, during the
Islamic revolution in Iran, the U.S. government used frozen assets to help facili-
tate the negotiation process: they traded frozen assets to assist in the release of
American hostages under the Algiers Declarations. 9
Another concern of the U.S. government is the precedence created when as-
sets of foreign countries are frozen and the resulting potential for reciprocal
actions. The government is concerned that if victims of terrorism are compen-
sated using the assets of foreign countries, other countries may commit similar-
82. Id. at 1287-88. "[V]ictims of terrorism [are subjected] to the uncertain political climate of
foreign relations--a situation over which they have no control." Id.
83. See Damrosch, supra note 65, at 64-65. See also Donovan, supra note 80; Baletsa, supra
note 61, at 1292-93; Murphy, supra note 61, at 139.
84. Robinson, supra note 75. See also Damrosch, supra note 65, at 64-65; Stamper, supra
note 3, at 159 (stating that despite tens of millions being seized by the U.S. Government after Sep-
tember I I"h , these seized assets may be insufficient to address the vast damages involved).
85. See Murphy, supra note 61, at 139. See also Donovan, supra note 80; Baletsa, supra note
61, at 1269 (attempts at seizing or attaching diplomatic property are even less likely to succeed,
given the "sacrosanct nature of diplomatic property.")
86. See Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1295-99 (detailing accounts of litigants attempting to attach
pieces of property yet being blocked from doing so constantly). See also Nancy Amoury Combs,
Carter, Reagan, and Khomeini: Presidential Transitions and International Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J.
303, 317 (2001) (detailing how the Carter administration, during the Iran hostage crisis, blocked the
entry of final judgments which would have allowed claimants to receive compensation from frozen
assets out of concern that the lawsuits would antagonize Iran and worsen the hostage crisis); Mur-
phy, supra note 61, at 138-39.
87. Robinson, supra note 75. See also Donovan, supra note 80; Mowbray, supra note 76;
Murphy, supra note 61, at 139.
88. See Sean K. Mangan, Compensation for "Certain" Victims of Terrorism Under Section
2002 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Individual Payments at an
Institutional Cost, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1037, 1069 (2002).
89. See Combs, supra note 86, at 327-28, 344. See also infra footnotes 136- 143 and accom-
panying text, discussing the establishment of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
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minded retaliation by using our own justifications in a manner against us: seiz-
ing American assets held abroad as enforcement in civil actions against us. 90
There exist few exceptions to this policy - there is only one notable exam-
ple of the United States allowing frozen assets to be used to compensate victims
of terrorism-related attacks. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 20009" liquidated frozen assets for families of 'Brothers to the Rescue', a
group of fliers who were shot down by Cuban jets in 1996,92 as well as a scant
few other lawsuits in which judgments had already been obtained, such as and
including the Flatow case. 93
Given this policy, the United States will likely engage in the same course of
action that it used in previous types of litigation. However, the situation at bar is
anticipated to be far different. The number of voices of those clamoring is far
greater than those of previous terrorist actions, and the scale of destruction is far
worse than has been seen in terrorist actions involving the United States previ-
ously.' The United States must adopt a different strategy in dealing with this
issue.
B. The Domestic Side of Lawsuits Stemming from September I lh: Airlines,
Aviation Security Companies, and Governmental Agencies
More than 100 lawsuits have already been filed against those believed to be
proximately responsible for the events o September 1 Ith.95 For some of the
90. See Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1289-93 (arguing that foreign nations may enact similar
steps against the United States, as a matter of reciprocity). See also Murphy, supra note 61, at 139
(stating that the Iranian parliament has passed a law allowing Iranian victims of "U.S. interference"
to sue the United States government in Iranian courts).
91. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464, 1542-43 (2000). See also Murphy, supra note 61, at 138-39 (discussing the VTVPA and
its effects on obtaining redress for claimants in greater depth). Murphy states that this new act
amends the FSIA to give the President power to prevent and manage attachment of property of
foreign terrorist states in the United States. Id. See also generally Mangan, supra note 88 (provid-
ing another analysis of the VTVPA).
92. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997). See also Damrosch,
supra note 65, at 70-71; Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1281-83; Murphy, supra note 61, at 135.
93. See Murphy, supra note 61, at 138 (discussing the extent and to whom the VTVPA ap-
plies).
94. It has been noted that as a result of the government's refusal and attempts to block the
seizure or attachment of property forces the families of victims of attacks to have to "relive their
personal tragedies on a daily basis." Baletsa, supra note 61, at 1299. In past cases, such as Flatow,
the number of citizens affected by the attacks were relatively few. That is certainly not the case
here.
95. See Kasindorf, supra note 51.
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plaintiffs, the lawsuits revolve around achieving higher compensation than could
be achieved by accepting settlement under the VCF.96 For other plaintiffs, the
lawsuits seek to obtain answers and finding out what went wrong on that day.97
These lawsuits target airlines, aviation security companies, and governmental
agencies. One of the first of these type of lawsuits was Mariani v. United Air
Lines.9" The Mariani case is but a portent of the potential litigation stemming
out of September 1 1 th, having been filed in United States District Court in New
York shortly after the attacks. Mariani seeks damages under a theory of wrong-
ful death and survival due to United Air Lines' failure to exercise due care on
September 1 th.99 Another case, In re September 11 Litigation, is comprised of
cases which have been consolidated into five master complaints-four for each
one of the plane crashes and the fifth for property damage."°° In that case,
United States District Court Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein recently ruled that plain-
tiffs could proceed with lawsuits against American and United Air Lines, avia-
tion security companies, and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey by
finding that the harm to those in the World Trade Center and surrounding area
was reasonably foreseeable by airport screeners and the managers of the World
Trade Center.' The defendants have countered that they hold no responsibility
as the suicide attacks had been impossible to guard against and were accordingly
not foreseeable: they claim the issue was terrorism, not negligence. °2 Whether
or not this litigation will be fruitful remains to be seen, but according to plain-
tiffs' counsel, the plaintiffs believe they can win.0 3
1. Problems in Attempting Recovery
As noted before, parties to this litigation face a process which is looks to be
long and uncertain." Furthermore, the ATSSSA has created two key issues
which limit the extent to which a plaintiff will be able to litigate his case. The
96. See, e.g., Gary Younge, Most 9/11 Families Fail To File Claims, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 1,
2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,3604,1033096,00.html.
97. See Kasindorf, supra note 51. To go with the VCF is to be out of the loop, according to
one litigant. Id.
98. Complaint, Mariani v. United Air Lines, filed December 20, 2001 in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, available at http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/
docs/terrorism/marianiual 122001cmp.pdf.
99. Id.
100. Mark Hamblett, Judge Refuses to Dismiss 9/11 Suits Against Airlines: Duty of Care Is
Owed to Hijackers' Victims on Ground as Well as in Flight, N.Y. L. J., Sept. 10, 2003, at 1.
101. See In re September 11 Litigation, No. 21 M.C. 97, 2003 WL 22251325, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 1, 2003). See also Hamblett, supra note 100, at 1.
102. 9/11 Liability Cases Given Go-Ahead, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Sep. 9, 2003, avail-
able at http://news.bbc.co.uk/lhi/world/ameficas/3094758.stm. See also Hamblett, supra note 100,
at I.
103. Hamblett, supra note 100, at 1.
104. See, e.g., supra notes 70 - 73 and accompanying text.
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first issue is by pursuing this type of civil lawsuit, parties to this action will be
unable to file a claim under the VCF.' °5 According to reports, less than half of
those who are entitled to file a claim with the VCF have actually expressed in-
terest in the VCF.' ° The second issue is that the VCF has imposed limitations
on the recovery allowable by these actions as against certain defendants: liability
can only be incurred to the maximum amount of liability coverage possessed by
an airline.' °7 These two issues are functionally analogous to the problems faced
by the litigants who are pursuing lawsuits on the international front: larger fed-
eral policies are intervening in the pursuit of this litigation. Once again, what
should be a relatively straightforward lawsuit is laced with many thorns.
C. Anticipated Lawsuits Stemming from September 1 1 1h
There is huge potential (some of which has already coming to fruition) for
lawsuits which do not stem from direct victims (such as those who sustained
direct personal injury or those who were killed) of September 11th. The prospect
of proximately-related lawsuits is potentially overwhelming. Experts in mass-
tort litigation and practitioners alike anticipate thousands of lawsuits stemming
out of the events of September 11th - these cases and claims could be "beyond
imagination."'0 ° Several factors add themselves to the prospect of additional
litigation.
The first and largest of these factors is the air quality issue. After the Twin
Towers fell, a huge dust cloud spread throughout lower Manhattan and into the
New York metropolitan area.' 9 Despite this huge dust cloud, Christine Whit-
man, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, claimed the air
was safe and told the public they could return to their homes and continue work
in the vicinity of Ground Zero."0 Between 30,000 to 50,000 workers, compro-
105. See supra notes 36 - 40 and accompanying text.
106. See 9/11 Liability Cases Given Go-Ahead, supra note 102.
107. See supra notes 41 - 42 and accompanying text.
108. Kubes, supra note 30, at 851. See also Rabin, supra note 14, at 1848-49.
109. See Campbell, supra note 18, at 421 (stating that "remote victims," such as those who were
enveloped by grit as a result of the debris spreading around lower Manhattan and who sustained
harm will be excluded by the VCF regulations addressing this problem). See also Kubes, supra note
30, at 845-49 (stating that the dust cloud created by the collapse of the Towers released a "chemical
soup" of chemical compounds and carcinogens which have lingered and have the potential to put
tens of thousands at risk from exposure to toxic substances); Rabin, supra note 14, at 1848-49.
110. Jane Kay, 9.11.01: Two Years Later: Ground Zero Air Quality Was 'Brutal'for Months:
UC Davis Scientist Concurs That EPA Reports Misled the Public, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10, 2003, at
Al. See also Marc Kaufman, Details on 9/11 Air Quality Questioned, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2003,
at A23.
15
Balahadia: Preparations for a Storm: A Proposal for Managing the Litigation
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2003
mised of rescuers, day laborers, and construction crews, joined in the Ground
Zero cleanup and recovery efforts."' In the days and weeks after September
1 1h, these rescuers and workers, as well as nearby residents, began experiencing
harsh coughing as well as other symptoms which became known as "World
Trade Center Syndrome.""' 2 Thousands of New Yorkers contacted the World
Trade Center health registry, reporting coughs, wheezing, shortness of breath,
and sinus inflammation." 3 The dust cloud has also been alleged to be the cause
of why pregnant women who were around or near to the World Trade Center
site were bearing babies which were smaller - the effects of the dust cloud
upon pregnancies was postulated to have the same effects as cigarette smoke." 4
Subsequently, it was determined that the EPA made assurances that the air
was safe to breathe despite 1) not having enough information to make such as-
surances, and, 2) not knowing what exactly was circulating in the air." 5 The
EPA then later said that workers and others exposed to debris were at risk for
acute and chronic lung and heart problems." 6 It was found that workers, rescu-
ers, and nearby residents were exposed to "a toxic brew of contaminants" that
included lead, silica, dioxins, asbestos, and sulfuric acid, as well as pulverized
glass fibers from shattered windows." 7 The government commissioned a $90
million study to examine the effects of toxin exposure upon workers present at
Ground Zero. 118 This study, conducted in part by Mount Sinai Medical Center,
found that of a sample of 8,000 workers, 75% now have persistent respiratory
problems. " 9 Elevated levels of airborne contaminants were detected for three
months after the attacks - it was not until January of 2002 that the air levels
returned to normal. 1
20
111. Stephanie Armour, Health Problems Plague Ground Zero Workers, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar.
3, 2003, at BO1.
112. Rabin, supra note 14, at 1843-44.
113. See Kay, supra note 110, at Al.
114. See Christine Haugney, Trade Center Debris May Have Affected Pregnancies, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 2003, at A03. The condition of intrauterine growth restriction has been linked to
exposure from air pollution. Id.
115. See Kay, supra note 110, at Al (emphasis added). See also Kaufman, supra note 110, at
A23. Before it made its announcement to the public, the White House toned down the initial EPA
report (for as of yet unfound reasons). Id.
116. Armour, supra note Il l, at BO .
117. Id. See also Kay, supra note I10, at Al.
118. Armour, supranote 11,atBo.
119. Amy Westfeldt, Doctors: Most 9-11 Workers Still Ailing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 28,
2003. In an unfortunate irony, it has been theorized that it is likely that many of these respiratory
problems could have been either prevented or minimized: Congressional inquires about the attack
found that OSHA had distributed 131,000 respirators after the attack but many workers did not wear
them, either finding them uncomfortable or thinking that they were unnecessary. Id. Other workers
had no training in how to use the masks while others didn't use them because the conditions at
Ground Zero were so severe that they had to remove the masks to be able to see. Armour, supra
note 11, at BO1.
120. Armour, supra note 111, at B01.
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Stress is another factor which could lead to additional litigation. Doctors
believe now that stress created by the attacks may have left some women infer-
tile.' 2' It has been estimated that 25% of pregnant women who found out they
were pregnant after September 11th were more likely to miscarry than those who
knew they were pregnant before the attacks. 2 2 In the Mount Sinai Medical Cen-
ter study, 40% of the workers sampled now have mental health problems be-
cause of the attacks. 123 The final factor is the potential for other lawsuits by
those who, while not directly or proximately connected to September I 1 1h, are
remotely connected, such as victims of anthrax attacks, soldiers killed during the
attacks, and soldiers killed by subsequent military actions in Afghanistan and
abroad. 124 Critics have observed that they are as deserving of compensation as
those killed on September 1 th. 125
Thus, there is a potential for many thousands of lawsuits, which could ad-
versely affect not only the functioning of our legal system, but also the welfare
of our cities. In a statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks,
Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City warned that the personal injury
lawsuits filed by plaintiffs claiming damages from cleaning up Ground Zero
could bankrupt the city in 20 years. 126 He has asked for "retrospective indemni-
fication" from personal injury lawsuits stemming from the clean up. 127 New
York City's Legal Department has already allocated $3 million dollars and
twenty-one lawyers in a special legal defense unit to defend the approximately
1,700 cases already stemming from September 1 Ith. 28
The events of September 11 th created a massive problem for our legal sys-
tem. The lawsuits described here are simply the tip of the iceberg - many more
have been filed and more will be filed due to September 11 th . These lawsuits
could create a situation like the asbestos litigation of the 1980s and 1990s: litiga-
tion some describe as a continuing deluge which "bankrupted an industry [and]
disrupted the judicial system far beyond any other mass tort episode in history,"
all with no end in sight. 29 The present and future September 1 Ith litigation has
121. Ania Lichtarowicz, Infertility Linked to 9/11 Stress, BBC NEWS UK EDITION, Oct. 15,
2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/health/3192836.stm.
122. Id.
123. Westfeldt, supra note 119.
124. See generally Campbell, supra note 33, at 6.
125. Id.
126. Joan Gralla, Mayor: WTC Personal Injury Suits Could Bankrupt NYC, REUTERS, Mar. 31,
2003.
127. Id.
128. Lawyer: NYC Firefighters' Claims Top $12B, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 15,2003.
129. Rabin, supra note 14, at 1831.
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the potential to be on par with that litigation. The ATSSSA and VCF made
strong contributions to help address the problems of September 1 lth; 13 ° in light
of the greater problems that we now face, a different solution is suggested.
IV. INTERNATIONAL REPARATIONS AND COMPENSATIONS TRIBUNALS
A. In General
International courts and tribunals are being increasingly used in the resolu-
tion of disputes. 3 ' Within the last twenty-five years, seven new major interna-
tional claim and compensation bodies and tribunals have been established, and
have collectively resolved more than 160,000 claims.'32 Clearly, these institu-
tions are an efficacious means in solving large-scale disputes and achieving fair
measures of justice.' The numerous resolutions many claimants have already
achieved by using these systems proves its efficacy. The scale of the litigation
stemming from September I Ith, as well as the issues present in this litigation,
demonstrate that these tribunals should serve as models for resolving these dis-
putes..' The next section discusses three of these bodies (the Iran-United
States Claim Tribunal, the United Nations Compensation Commission, and the
Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland) which have
130. See id. at 1833 (alleging that Congress was either inattentive or unconcerned about the
"exposure only victims" of the attacks).
131. Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: International
Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 160, 160 (2000). See also John Kim,
International Institutions: International Legal Developments in Review: 1996 Public International
Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 671, 673 (1997); John J. Kim & Gregory Gerdes, International Institutions:
International Legal Developments in Review: 1997 Public International Law, 32 INT'L LAW. 575,
575 (1998).
132. See The International Judiciary in Context, available at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/PICT.Synopic.Chart.2.0.pdf (providing a more thorough look at the interna-
tional judiciary system). There are currently seven major international claim and compensation
bodies: the fran-United States Claims Tribunal (est. 1980) (as of 2000, this body had resolved more
than 3,000 claims); the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal (est. 1983); the United Nations
Compensation Commission (est. 1991) (as of 2000, this body had resolved more than 125,000
claims); the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (Bosnia and
Herzegovina) (est. 1995) (as of 2000, this body had resolved more than 25,000 claims); the Claims
Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland (est. 1997) (as of 2000, this body had
resolved more than 7,500 claims); the German Forced Labour Compensation Programme (est. 2000);
and, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (est. 2000). Id.
133. See Kim & Gerdes, supra note 131, at 576.
134. The idea of using reparations in the United States is not a novel one-the idea of using
reparations to compensate for slavery has been proposed for years. See generally Ellen Wulfhorst,
U.S. Slave Reburial Fans Question of Reparations, REUTERS, Oct. 27, 2003.
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been used to resolve claims in situations similar to the September 1 Ith related
litigation.'35
B. The Iran- United States Claim Tribunal
The Iran-United States Claim Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "IUSCT")
was created at the beginning of the Reagan administration. 36 The IUSCT was
established in part by the Claims Settlement Declaration 37 of the Algiers Decla-
rations to address the numerous claims presented by the two main effects of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran: the overthrow of the Shah as well as the Iran hostage
crisis.'38 During the Islamic Revolution, Iran was actually directly sponsoring
actions against Americans, namely the taking of hostages at the U.S. Em-
bassy. '39 Initially, President Carter imposed sanctions on and blocked assets of
Iran in response. 4 ' In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution and President
Carter's actions, the IUSCT was created in part because many claimants who
had lost property and assets as a result of the Islamic Revolution wanted to at-
tach frozen Iranian assets in the hope of satisfying a judgment.' 4 ' Their efforts
were barred by the Carter administration. 4 2 In balancing methods of recovery,
the IUSCT, as originally presented, offered the best hope for claimants seeking
compensation on their claims.'43
In many ways, the scenario during that time mirrors the problems being
faced by some of the September 1 I th litigants today. Some of the litigants and
claimants in the situation at hand are seeking recourse against foreign states and
organizations who are alleged to have assisted in terrorist efforts, while the
shadow of U.S. foreign policy looms in the background, waiting to intervene.
The prospect of successfully litigating claims today echoes the same sort of
foreign policy issues presented by the Iran situation. Because of these strong
135. Although the three bodies discussed herein may form the initial framework upon which
the idea of a compensation tribunal for September 11' h is predicated, these should not be the sole
models on which the compensation tribunal should be based.
136. Alford, supra note 54, at 208-09 (explaining how the IUSCT is "the darling of the interna-
tional legal community's response to revolutions," and how the IUSCT illustrates the steps taken
after a revolution).
137. See Combs, supra note 86, at 325-26.
138. See id. at 306.
139. Seeid. at 315.
140. See id. at 316-17.
141. See generally id. at 384-87.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 346-48.
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similarities, the IUSCT has the prospect of being used as a model in implement-
ing a compensation body today.
C. The United Nations Compensation Commission
The United Nations Security Council created the United Nations Compen-
sation Commission (hereinafter referred to as "UNCC") in May 1991 - the
purpose of this tribunal is to provide redress procedures for Iraq's invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, in light of the numerous claims arising from the event."'
Claimants received compensation from funds derived from the proceeds of
Iraq's oil sales and exports.'45 The UNCC has established an excellent track
record for adjudicating mass claims.'46 The UNCC is headed by a president and
consists of a governing council comprised of representatives of the same fifteen
nations which compromise the Security Council.'47 The UNCC has created
twenty-one three-person panels of commissioners who hear claims of differing
types and suggest awards. 4 8 The UNCC allows for claims based on personal
injury, business, and losses involving tangible and other types of property.'49
Payment of awards derives from proceeds of exports by Iraq of petroleum or
petroleum products. 5 °
Similar to claimants after the Gulf War, September 11th litigants and claim-
ants are in the position of having to assert claims against foreign bodies and
organizations for compensation. Additionally, their needs are counter to that of
the foreign government, and the presence of a strong U.S. policy interest weighs
into the situation as well. Given the large number of claims that have been and
144. See William E. Huth, The Iraq Claims Tribunal: An Overview of the U.N. Compensation
Commission, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 25, 25 (1999). The JNCC was established by Security Council
Resolution 687 adopted on April 3, 1991. Id. See also MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES
AND COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 478 (1997).
145. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 144, at 478.
146. Huth, supra note 144, at 25. See also Veijo Heiskanen & Robert O'Brien, UN Compensa-
tion Commission Panel sets Precedents on Government Claims, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 339, 340 (1998).
See generally Kim, supra note 131, at 673; Keith Highet, et al., International Courts and Tribunals,
31 INT'L LAW. 599, 602-05 (1997) (discussing various methods used by the UNCC in resolving
claims); Roger P. Alford & Peter H.F. Bekker, International Courts and Tribunals, 32 INT'L LAW.
499, 502-06 (1998) (discussing various methods used by the UNCC in resolving claims).
147. Huth, supra note 144, at 26. See generally John R. Crook, The United Nations Compensa-
tion Commission--A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 144 (1993)
(giving a detailed discussion of the UNCC administration).
148. Huth, supra note 144, at 26. These commissioners are employed on a part-time basis,
with their sole responsibility being the adjudication of claims. Id. They are supported by a secre-
tariat, whose executive secretary reports to the council and provides support. Id. Claims are divided
into six categories: A-D handle individuals' and families' claims, E handles corporate claims, and F
handles governmental claims. Id. The last day to have submitted a claim was January 1, 1996. Id.
149. Huth, supra note 144, at 28. See also Crook, supra note 147, at 153-56.
150. Huth, supra note 144, at 32-33.
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will be presented as a result of September I1 th , the case management system
utilized by the UNCC could provide a good basis upon which to devise a man-
agement scheme for September 1 1th. These factors, as well as the proven effi-
cacy of the UNCC, provide ample support for using this international compensa-
tion body as a model for the September 1 h litigation.
D. The Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland
On June 25, 1997, the Volcker Commission"' announced the establishment
of a claims resolution body known as the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dor-
mant Accounts in Switzerland (hereinafter referred to as "CRT"). 5 2 The CRT
was established by private parties and created to be an international arbitration
tribunal that would serve as a balancing mechanism to resolve claims to Holo-
caust-era Swiss bank accounts in light of class-action litigation.'53 This class-
action litigation had been filed in New York by the families of victims of the
Holocaust against Swiss banks.'54 Instead of litigating directly against those
responsible (namely the German government and German companies), the liti-
gants in the Holocaust litigation sued the Swiss banks who were holding funds
of those killed during the Holocaust.'55
Originally, the CRT was created separately from the class-action litigation;
however, in 1998, the CRT was merged into the class-action litigation:156 as part
of the global settlement between the class-action litigants and the Swiss banks,
151. Roger P. Alford, The Claims Resolution Tribunal and Holocaust Claims Against Swiss
Banks, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 250, 259 (2002). The Volcker Commission was an independent
body established by various Jewish organizations and Swiss banks to provide for the restitution and
full accounting of monies owed to victims of the Holocaust that were being held by Swiss banks. Id.
152. Id.
153. Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 11, 14-20 (2002) (detailing the litigation process against various banks).
154. Alford, supra note 151, at 252, 259. See also Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating the Holo-
caust, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 601, 608 (1999) (explaining that at one point the State Department
claimed that the aggressive tactics used to force a settlement were interfering with American foreign
policy).
155. See Bazyler, supra note 154, at 604. A frequently asked question is: why is it only now
that this litigation is proceeding? Id. at 605. Bazyler argues that relatively recent U.S. legislation
such as the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act have permitted this litiga-
tion to move forward. Id. at 605-06. In the absence of this legislation, past lawsuits would have
been laughed out of court. Id. at 606. See also Bazyler, supra note 153, at 13. Bazyler, in this
article, argues further that the development of human rights law has allowed lawsuits like the Holo-
caust litigation to be able to flourish. Id.
156. Alford, supra note 15 1, at 259-60. The tribunal was merged into the litigation by consent
of the parties, a rare move in international arbitration. Id. at 260.
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the CRT melded into the class-action litigation as an additional means for dis-
pensing settlement funds stemming from the litigation.157 The CRT has inspired
other movements for justice to follow in its wake, such as victims of Armenian
genocide who are seeking reimbursement for insurance proceeds paid by rela-
tives who were killed.
1 58
The unique situation posed by the attempt of the resolution of accounts
bears similarities to the situation being faced by those entering into September
1 1 th litigation. Similar to the September 11th claimants, the interests of the class
suing the Swiss banks were opposite the interests of the Swiss banks, and there
is a strong public policy interest (the U.S. government) providing an intervening
factor. The current and prospective plaintiffs of the September 1 Ith litigation
face analogous hurdles.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR MANAGING THE LITIGATION STEMMING FROM
SEPTEMBER 1 1T", 2001
Given all the factors discussed thus far: the limited nature and criticisms of
the VCF; the current September 1 1 th lawsuits; the anticipated litigation from
September 1 1h; the problems inherent in recovery; and finally, the proven effi-
cacy of international reparation and compensation bodies, it is proposed that the
United States government establish and utilize some form of a compensation
tribunal to compensate those victims of September 1 1 th who have filed and who
will file lawsuits based on September 1 1h . This tribunal would be modeled after
previous mass claim tribunals and would be appropriate to address the scope of
the problems here. This tribunal could serve to head off future litigation, and it
underscores the critical theme of balancing: all involved here have many dispa-
rate interests and needs which need to be addressed. 5 9 There is a storm facing
our courts if we do not something to try to head it off. The idea presented here
is a possible means of heading off that storm.
In this next section, I will address some of the particular concerns that a tri-
bunal of this type could present: first, I will examine some potential funding
issues as well as eligibility issues. I will then discuss the ramifications of put-
157. Id. at 260. The CRT is limited in its jurisdictional focus to claims stemming from dormant
Holocaust-era accounts. Id. It utilizes a judicial case-by-case manner to resolve claims that come
before it. Id. This is contrary to that of other agencies, such as the UNCC and the VCF, which use
an administrative procedure to process claims.
158. Bazyler, supra note 153, at 33-34. Bazyler also discusses two other notable movements
which are an outgrowth of the CRT: that of victims of slave labor by Japan and Japanese industry
(Id. at 25-33) as well as African-American reparations for slavery (Id. at 34-38).
159. Concededly, it is acknowledged that in trying to find a middle ground, neither side will be
fully satisfied. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 54, at 212 (arguing that even through reparations may
try to embrace both parties, neither side will be truly satisfied, as illustrated in the context of the
UNCC).
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ting such a system into effect and review arguments both for and against this
method.
A. Thoughts on Funding
In developing a compensation tribunal of this type, one of the principal con-
cerns is: if a compensatory tribunal is being established, where exactly would
the money to compensate derive from? It is likely that much of the funds would
have to be provided from governmental funds. However, some of the funding
could draw from other sources, such as foreign assets that are frozen by the U.S.
government. According to the Terrorist Assets Report of 2002 issued by the
Treasury Department, more than $6 million in assets (in which there exists an
interest of an international terrorist organization or other related designated
party) have been blocked."6 Another $4 billion in assets of countries being
designated as state sponsors of terrorism are within the jurisdictional reach of
the United States.' 6' Of this money, more than $3.8 billion has been blocked by
the Treasury Department pursuant to economic sanctions imposed by the United
States. 6 Being mindful of the fact that the government uses these frozen assets
as diplomatic bargaining chips, 63 it is still possible that some of these assets
could be liquidated to provide compensation, similar to the Victims of Traffick-
ing and Violence Protection Act of 2000."& The rationale in using these assets
is purely utilitarian: diverting some of these assets to help satisfy claims could
serve both the needs of the government (diplomatic needs and also appeasing the
needs of its citizens) as well as September 11th claimants.
Funding could also come from sources abroad. The United States was a
signatory to the UN-adopted International Convention for the Suppression of the
160. Terrorist Assets Report, Calendar Year 2002: Annual Report to the Congress on Assets in
the United States of Terrorist Countries and International Terrorism Program Designees, available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/reports/tar2OO2.pdf. This $6 million includes assets from al
Qaeda, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Kahane Chai, and the Taliban. Id. This money
taken from these terrorist groups and used instead to help claimants could serve to help satisfy the
goal of the Havlish and Burnett lawsuits: namely, to deprive terrorists of financial means.
161. Terrorist Assets Report, supra note 160.
162. Id. These blocked assets are from Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan. Id.
Syria, the seventh country designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor of terrorism, has
not had assets blocked. Id.
163. See supra notes 82 - 89 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 91 - 93 and accompanying text. The U.S. government could still retain
control of much of the assets, but using at least part of them could help satisfy potential claimants.
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Financing of Terrorism 165 (hereinafter referred to as "SF1") on January 10,
2000.166 The United Nations subsequently ratified the SFT on April 10, 2002.167
One of the purposes of this convention is to use monies seized or obtained by
forfeiture to compensate victims of terrorist offenses. 68 This is the first time an
international scheme has been used to target financial sponsors of terrorist activ-
ity in addition to actual perpetrators. 69  While the SFT is principally used for
criminal offenses, monies derived from the SFT could also be used as compen-
sation in civil cases.
70
Finally, a potential (yet admittedly, highly unlikely) source of funding may
be through settlement agreements. The Holocaust litigation ultimately led to a
settlement which provided the funding base for the CRT. 17 1 In theory, (assum-
ing, of course, that defendants actually appear and litigate the case 72) it is pos-
sible the litigants may reach a settlement agreement, which could then provide
additional funds for compensation. Again, although highly unlikely, it could be
a theoretical source of funding following the results in the Holocaust Litigation.
B. Thoughts on Eligibility
The VCF has a major flaw in its design: it has a limited scope as to who can
qualify for compensation. Accordingly, many are filing lawsuits to obtain com-
pensation.73 The tribunal proposed here would expand the scope of those who
165. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, GA Res.
54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999), 39 ILM 270 (2000). See generally Sean D. Murphy, Conventions on the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and on Financing, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 255, 257 (2002) (discuss-
ing recommendations and implications of the SFT).
166. U.S. Signs International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
Jan. 10, 2000, USUN Press Release, available at http://www.un.int/usa/00_004.htm. See also Mur-
phy, supra note 165, at 257.
167. Treaty on Suppression of Financing of Terrorism Comes into Force, Apr. 9, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/en/news/2002/pressrels/lt4366e.htm. Of note here is the fact
that the United States has not been a full participant in its commitment to international institutions
like the UN. See Kim & Gerdes, supra note 131, at 575. The U.S. is behind in payments to the UN
for approximately $1.5 billion dollars, and its lack of commitment in other areas seriously under-
mines the United States' commitment to the UN.
168. See Intemational Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra
note 165.
169. Judy Aita, U.S. Signs International Treaty Targeting the Financing of Terrorism, Wash-
ington File, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/00011201.htm.
170. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra
note 165.
171. See Bazyler, supra note 154, at 608-09, 616, 623. Bazyler details the process of how a
multiparty settlement (amongst Swiss banks, German banks, government, and industries, as well as
Austrian banks) was reached in the Holocaust litigation which would, in part, later be used as a key
funding source of the CRT. Id.
172. See supra notes 70 - 73 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 95 - 103 and accompanying text.
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could receive compensation. A tribunal of this type could preempt the many
anticipated lawsuits that are being sought as a result of September 1 'th and sup-
plant the VCF as the principal means of compensation for September 1 1 th related
injuries. Furthermore, it would disallow suits against foreign parties in the in-
terests of balancing government needs against private needs. It would reduce
the overall amount of litigation in the courts; conversely, it would disallow
many from pursuing normal legal means. Many questions would have to be
addressed if this tribunal were to be implemented: How would this tribunal be
implemented?' 74 What should the standard of proof be?' 75 Who exactly would
qualify?176 What about other victims of other terrorist acts?
177
C. Ramifications of a Tribunal of This Type: In Favor Of and Against
One of the most natural counterarguments to the idea of this tribunal is en-
acting such a form would suspend due process and other fundamental Constitu-
tional rights. To a certain degree, that is true. However, the problem we face is
an extraordinary one, to say the least. An appropriate means of dealing with this
problem is therefore demanded: extraordinary problems require innovative solu-
tions. Furthermore, methods of this type are not radical nor untested - they
have been used in other contexts before with great success.
Another argument would be the positional arguments from each side;
namely, by the implementation of this tribunal, their needs will not be fully met
or served. That is likely to be true, but the fact of the matter is that it is practi-
174. Implementation could be designed along the lines of the VCF, only with a much larger
scope in eligibility.
175. The compensation bodies discussed previously have varying standards of proof when
bringing a claim - a claimant before the CRT is required to show that it is "plausible" in light of all
the circumstances that he or she is entitled to the dormant account, while a claimant before the
UNCC must show a "reasonable degree of certainty" for each element of the claim through docu-
mentary evidence. See Alford, supra note 131, at 169.
176. The VCF is limited to those "present at the site" during "the immediate aftermath" of
September 11h. See supra notes 26 - 33 and accompanying text. As demonstrated, many more
were adversely affected. Id. The obvious problem here is inclusion: at what point should people be
disallowed from compensation? Questions of proximity are beyond the scope of this paper.
177. American citizens have the target of other terrorist actions, such as the World Trade Cen-
ter bombing in 1993, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and the Oklahoma City bombing. This tribunal
could be expanded to assist all who are victims of terrorist attacks. But the key problem in expan-
sion is definitional scope: the government has adopted varying definitions of "terrorism" in various
contexts. See, e.g., Louis Rene Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism - Jurisprudential and Defini-
tional Clarifications, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 240 (discussing various concepts of terror-
ism and arguing for a single definitive standard as to what "terrorism" means). Questions of this
type are beyond the scope of this paper.
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cally impossible to be able to meet the needs of all the parties involved here.
The interests of the government and legal system, the interests of those suing
foreign states and terrorist-related organizations, and the interests of those suing
for September 11' h related injuries all have direct conflicts with each other.
Mindful of that, the operative theme of the idea presented here is balance. Some
interests may be lost, but many other interests can be won.
VI. CONCLUSION
The situation presented to us today by September 1 1 th is a complex web of
issues that needs to be untangled. The ATSSSA and VCF provided a good start
on the road to recovery - but Congress could not have anticipated the myriad
of other problems that would be caused by September 1 lth. It is hoped that the
ideas presented here can be a viable potential mechanism for resolving this dis-
pute, and serve to balance the needs of all involved.
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